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Google and China Eight Weeks Later:
Where Are We Now?
Posted on March 1, 2010 by Editor
Editorial by Jeffrey Barlow
In the February issue of Interface, my editorial was on “Google and China: Minor Incident or
Cyberwar?” [1]. One month after that piece and two months after the incident was announced, I
want to revisit the issues here, because it gives us some insight into the notion of “cyber war,” if
it clarifies little else.
While it is not my intent here to defend my earlier judgments, arrived at during six weeks of
working in China, I think it easy enough to do so. My first judgment was simply that nothing is
certain.
We now know a bit more, but given the amount of time which has passed, surprisingly little. We
do not know, for example, how serious an impact the event will in fact have, either on Google’s
relationship with China, or China’s relationship with the U. S. Google now says that it will be
meeting with the Chinese government after the New Year’s holidays end there [2].
Interestingly, Google’s focus has apparently become less the incidents themselves than its desire
to provide unfiltered searches in China—this is the issue being negotiated. While it is true that
Google frequently conflated these issues in the initial responses to the incident, it is somewhat
surprising to see the issue boiled down to this. If the incidents are to be used as a bargaining chip
with China, it makes sense to make the issue network filtering. I do, however, have a fair
amount of experience bargaining with Chinese institutions and officials, and I am very glad that I
am not on that Google bargaining team—it will be very hard to get fruitfully from the one issue
—”you hacked our servers!” to “And…uh….so we want an end to filtering!”
One reason this bargaining process is surprising is that the change in emphasis amounts in part
to an affirmation of the position taken by many Chinese sources who felt that the issue was more
a commercial one than a defense of privacy on Google’s part. Unfiltered searching, for example,
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will not provide any additional protection to the Chinese dissidents who were supposedly hacked
in the incidents.
But an end to filtering would be very good for Google’s share of the search market in China
because it would then be the only completely open search engine for Chinese users. Other
engines, notably Baidu, which has about two-thirds of the Chinese market to Google’s less than
one-third, will, as Chinese corporations, be obliged to follow Chinese laws.
We also know a bit more about the origins of the attacks. Google invited the National Security
Agency into the investigation in early February [3]. Whether the additional information comes from
NSA or not, it is now held that the direct source of the attack was two Chinese educational
institutions. However, because of the inherent uncertainties involved in trying to trace artful cyber
attacks, our understanding has not in fact been decisively furthered. To quote The New York
Times statement at the discovery:
“Within the computer security industry and the Obama administration, analysts differ over
how to interpret the finding that the intrusions appear to come from schools instead of
Chinese military installations or government agencies. Some analysts have privately
circulated a document asserting that the vocational school is being used as camouflage for
government operations. But other computer industry executives and former government
officials said it was possible that the schools were cover for a “false flag” intelligence
operation being run by a third country. Some have also speculated that the hacking could be a
giant example of criminal industrial espionage, aimed at stealing intellectual property from
American technology firms” [4].
These are pretty much some of the possibilities I discussed in February, though the mention of
two specific Chinese schools is certainly an important new wrinkle.
I remain suspicious of anybody’s ability to identify the source of an attack without being able to
access the machine that was directly involved, or, at a minimum, generous assistance from the
Internet Providers involved. It is my understanding that to trace the activities taking place on a
“captured” computer, that is, one to which a hacker has gained control, it is not enough to
merely trace the attacker back to a network. To do so is to leave open the possibility that the
attack went to that network, to a specific machine, but from that machine (another captured
one) hopped to yet another network and another captured machine, and perhaps another and
another. As The New York Times put it in part of an article which otherwise tries to build the case
against the two Chinese universities:
“Beijing has not announced an investigation, but Web security experts emphasize that the
Chinese government would need to be involved to find the ultimate perpetrators of the
attacks.
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“The U.S. would not be able to trace this” back to the source, said O. Sami Saydjari, the
founder of the Cyber Defense Agency, a private Web security firm based in Wisconsin. “We
cannot trace it beyond borders. We’d need the cooperation of the Chinese” [5].
In China, Internet Providers are both few in number and tightly controlled. If the Chinese
government is in any way involved in the attacks—and if it is not, it is difficult to see the point of
the issue, it just becomes another of hundreds of thousands of daily hacking events, possibly
devoid of political or international significance at all—then it is difficult to imagine the Chinese
government pitching in to, in effect, investigate itself.
We have now traced the series of attacks being generally described as the Google attack to two
networks in China, but until we are able to actually access the machines directly involved we
have stopped short of certainty—that is the hackers may have utilized that machine as a route
into yet another undiscovered source. This is why the experts quoted above left open the three
possibilities that they mentioned, each of which recognizes the possibility of yet another
undetected hop out of the network.
There are also some real shortcomings in the research of the American authorities concerned,
which quickly announced that one of the two schools, the Lanxian Vocational School in
Shandong, was closely linked to the Chinese military. There is a great deal of controversy over
this particular designation [6] —many feel it rather to be a down-at-the-heels junior college
equivalent incapable of producing true elite hackers and we must again wait for additional
information to accumulate [7].
The other university, Shanghai Jiaotong, is indeed an elite school, comparable to America’s
M.I.T. in China. Evidence, however, is largely circumstantial beyond the bare fact that apparently
the attack was related to its network at some point [8].
The uncertainties inherent in this incident have provided a feast for news organizations. China is
so high on the American media radar at present that the story has been repeated endlessly. One
recent exhaustive analysis of the news gathering process on this one story by Jonathan Stray of
the Neiman Media Labs [9], made this point:
“We often talk about the new news ecosystem — the network of traditional outlets, new
startups, nonprofits, and individuals who are creating and filtering the news. But how is the
work of reporting divvied up among the members of that ecosystem?
 
To try to build a datapoint on that question, I chose a single big story and read every single
version listed on Google News to see who was doing the work. Out of the 121 distinct
versions of last week’s story about tracing Google’s recent attackers to two
schools in China, 13 (11 percent) included at least some original reporting. And
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just seven organizations (six percent) really got the full story independently.”
That is, of the welter of commentary and reporting on the issue, only a few sources possess real
authority [10]. The others are not only repeating secondary reports, but often adding additional
commentary and opinion to those original stories. This has been particularly true for the cyber
war boffins, both individuals and institutions, including American defense groups, which stand to
gain by increased anxieties and the resultant hope of enhancing their budgets.
Shay has a very useful table of the 121 unique stories which he examined from which a number
of conclusions can be drawn: The New York Times was at least the partial source for the great
majority of the stories. A number did access Chinese English-language sources, notably Xinhua,
but only 18 of the 121 accessed any Chinese sources at all.
What then, at the last, do we learn about cyber war? The lessons to me seem to boil down
once again to a very few:
There is always going to be an element of uncertainty involved where cyber attacks are
concerned.
This uncertainty magnifies the risk of bad judgments.
Where Sino-American relations are involved, there are major commercial and political
interests internal to the U.S. involved, which further complicates the issues.
We are certain that there will be additional issues over the Google events, and we look forward
to following them here at Interface.
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